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The

Appellee

Truck

Insurance

Exchange

respectfully

petitions the Court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter.
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
Harold C. Verhaaren, counsel for the Appellee/Petitioner,
Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), certifies that this Petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this Petition for
Rehearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL
The Defendant/Appellants John Olcott and Betty Olcott,
dba JB's Pepper Tree Market ("OlcottsM) appealed from the Summary
Judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court granting TIE•s motion for
summary judgment dated December 13, 1991.

Oral argument of the

appeal was heard on September 27, 1994, by The Honorable Pamela T.
Greenwood, The Honorable Gregory K. Orme, and The Honorable
Russell W. Bench.

The Court, on its own motion, issued its

expedited decision pursuant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

In an order dated September 27, 1994, this

Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the

- 1-

trial court for further proceedings.

No written explanation for

the Court's Order of Reversal1 was given
POINTS OF FACT AND LAW OVERLOOKED OR
MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT
TIE respectfully submits that the points of fact and law
specified below were apparently overlooked or misapprehended by the
Court. Because there is no written explanation or statement of the
grounds

for the Court's

decision, TIE'S

undersigned

counsel

acknowledges that he has necessarily speculated regarding the
reasons for the Court's decision, but believes the filing of this
Petition for Rehearing is appropriate, as the issues which were
properly

before

the

Court

for

its

review

are

relatively

uncomplicated.
I.

OLCOTTS DID NOT OPPOSE THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY TIE IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
It appears the Court has overlooked the fact that the

affidavit of its representative and employee, Brad Chilton (the
"Chilton Affidavit")2 filed in support of TIE'S Motion for Summary
Judgment is unopposed.

The Olcotts filed no opposing affidavit,

nor have they otherwise disputed any of the facts contained in
Chilton's Affidavit.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides, in part:
1

A copy of the Order of Reversal is included in the Addendum
to this Petition ("Addendum") as Attachment A.
2

A copy of Chilton's Affidavit is included in the Addendum as
Attachment B.
- 2-

When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts, showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment shall
be entered against him.
Further, in their Memorandum (R. at 417) opposing TIE'S
motion for summary judgment, Olcotts did not controvert any of the
statements contained in the "Undisputed Facts" portion of TIE'S
memorandum.

Rule

4-501(2) (b)

of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Administration provides:
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing part relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant' s facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by
an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party's statement.
(Emphasis
added.)
The facts, therefore, as stated in the Chilton Affidavit
and in TIE's statement of undisputed facts are deemed admitted by
the Olcotts.

Moreover, the denials in their Answer to TIE'S

Complaint are not sufficient to counter the Chilton Affidavit.
Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1983); D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).

Olcotts

simply failed in their affirmative duty to respond with affidavits
- 3 -

or other materials allowed by subdivision (e) of Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The inescapable conclusion is that
there are no material facts in dispute.
II.

OLCOTTS* ASSERTED NO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THEIR ANSWER
TO TIE'S COMPLAINT.
Olcotts'

Answer3

affirmative defenses.

to

TIE's

Complaint

contains

no

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure requires that affirmative defenses must be set forth in
the Answer.

If they are not so asserted, they are waived, and may

not be put in issue by a denial.

Pratt v. Board of Education,

564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken.
668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983).
Notwithstanding their failure to plead any affirmative
defenses, Olcotts have argued on appeal, and apparently this Court
may have accepted their argument, that TIE is barred by the
principles of estoppel and laches from claiming any earned premium
due other than the "estimate" on their application to Prematic
Service Corporation for financing.

They also argued that TIE is

estopped from claiming any premium due because the first notice of
cancellation dated January 22, 1985, did not indicate an earned
premium was due.

The latter estoppel argument, even had Olcotts

not waived this defense, is without merit in light of the fact that
a payment notice to the Olcotts dated on or about March 16, 1985
3

A copy of Olcotts • Answer in included in the Addendum as
Attachment C.
- 4 -

(R. at 257) and a notice of cancellation to them dated April 14,
1985 (R. at 258) do show an earned premium due and demand payment.
In any event, these and Olcotts1 arguments based upon estoppel,
laches and other avoidance defenses should be rejected by this
Court, just as they were by the trial court.
III.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ADJUDICATED
ALL CLAIMS REMAINING IN THIS ACTION.
Olcotts asserted, for the first time during the rebuttal

portion of their oral argument on appeal, that there are claims
remaining in this action which were not adjudicated by the trial
court's grant of TIE'S motion for summary judgment.

If such were

the case, why did they not move for certification of the summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as

they

would

be

required

to

do

if

there

were

unadjudicated claims remaining, or why did they not seek an appeal
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
Olcotts chose the course they have followed on appeal and should be
bound by their election.

Based upon the record, there can be no

conclusion other than that the trial court and the Olcotts deemed
the summary judgment to be a final appealable order.

Olcotts'

belated argument to the contrary is without merit and should have
been rejected.

- 5 -

IV.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED ISSUES RAISED BY
OLCOTTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
For the first time on appeal, Olcotts raised issues

relating to (1) the affirmative defenses referred to in Point II
above; (2) the issue that all claims were not adjudicated by the
trial court referred to in Point III above; (3) the issue that
TIE'S Complaint, to the extent that it seeks to recover earned
premiums computed at the preferred ratef is barred by the statute
of limitations; and (4) the claim that TIE'S Complaint does not
seek recovery based on the Olcott's first application, but is based
on the second application.4

Because these issues were not raised

in the proceedings before the trial court, this Court should not
have considered them. Ong Int' 1 (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. ,
850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of
Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

Moreover, Olcotts made no

claim, and there has been no showing, that the trial court
committed plain error.

4

Significantly, Olcotts' assertion in this regard is a
complete reversal of their argument opposing TIE'S first motion for
summary judgment, when they asserted that the Complaint is based on
the first application.
Their argument on appeal, that the
Complaint is based on the second application, was not raised at the
trial court (R. at 417-425).
- 6 -

V.

ONLY THOSE ISSUES SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO TIE'S SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT FOR REVIEW.
In their belated attempt to show a genuine factual

dispute, Olcotts, throughout their brief and during oral argument,
improperly asserted arguments which relate only to TIE•s first
motion

for summary

judgment.

All material

factual disputes

relating to that motion, however, were conceded by TIE for purposes
of its second motion for summary judgment, and are not before this
Court for review.

TIE accepted the Olcotts contention that: (1)

they never submitted or authorized the submission of a second
application

for insurance coverage;

(2) they did not desire

insurance coverage at TIE'S standard rate; (3) the signature on the
second application is not the signature of Betty Olcott; (4) the
Olcotts• liability for insurance coverage must be limited to the
earned premium calculated at the preferred or lower rate and (5)
the period of insurance coverage extended from March 30, 1984, only
to February 6, 1985, rather than to April 30, 1985.

Thus, all

factual disputes relating to the second application have been
eliminated. Moreover, the rate and premium calculations set forth
in the Chilton Affidavit have never been challenged by the Olcotts
and during oral argument on appeal, their counsel acknowledged the
accuracy of such calculations.

- 7 -

VI.

OLCOTTS* INSURANCE COVERAGE WAS PROVIDED PURSUANT TO
POLICY NO 6572-64-73 AND THAT POLICY IS THE SUBJECT OF
TIE'S COMPLAINT.
TIE seeks to recover the earned premium owed by Olcotts

for insurance coverage provided them pursuant to policy no.
6572-64-73.
Complaint.

This is the policy which is the subject of TIE'S
There is no other policy.

It appears that Olcotts

successfully diverted the Court's attention from this fact with
their contention that the Complaint is based upon the second,
rather than the first, application.

As noted in Point IV above,

Olcotts' argument is a complete (and convenient) about-face from
their argument opposing TIE'S first motion for summary judgment,
when they contended that the Complaint is based upon the first,
rather than the second, application.

This switching of positions

to suit their convenience does not, however, create any dispute as
to a genuine issue of fact, nor does it make any difference as a
matter of law.

The undisputed facts remain that Olcotts received

the insurance coverage they requested, the coverage was provided
pursuant to the policy designated in TIE'S Complaint, and they
failed to pay for that coverage, regardless of whether the premium
is calculated at the standard or preferred rate.

Because the

damages sought in TIE'S Complaint is different from those proved
and awarded does not alter the foregoing facts or render the
Complaint defective.

The law does not require the exact dollar

amount of damages to be specifically pleaded, even when the damages
- 8 -

sought are special damages•

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.,

811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991) and cases therein cited.
VII.

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH LAW, TIE IS REQUIRED
TO PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE AT THE RATES APPROVED BY
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER.
The Insurance Code5 of the State of Utah specifies that

one of its purposes is "to protect policy holders and the public
against the adverse effects of excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory rates"6 and provides that:
No insurer shall make or permit any unfair
discrimination in favor of particular individuals
or persons, between insurants or subjects of
insurants having substantially like insuring risks
and exposure factors . . .
or in the rate or
amount of premiums charged therefor . . . .7
To assure that the foregoing purposes are realized, the Insurance
Code requires that insurers use only those rate filed with and
approved by the insurance commissioner.
The earned premium which TIE seeks to recover has been
computed at and conforms to the rates approved by the insurance
commissioner for the period in question.9 Those rates reflect not
only the rates approved by the insurance commissioner, but the
reasonable cost of the insurance coverage provided by TIE.
5

References are to Utah's Insurance Code effective in 198485, i.e., Utah Code Annotated §§ 31-18-1 et seq.
6

§ 38-18-1(2)

7

§ 31-27-22(1)

9

Chilton Affidavit, paragraph 14.
- 9 -

If this Court's decision is intended to support the
principle urged by Olcotts, that an insurance agent's quote of an
estimated premium relieves the insurer from adhering to the rates
approved by the insurance commissioner/ then the Court, in effect,
has allowed the repeal of the statutes in question through the nonlegislative device of an agents' estimate.

Does an agent in Utah

have authority to fix rates different than those approved pursuant
to state statute?

TIE urges that such a conclusion is not only

contrary to the provisions of the Insurance Code, but is a
significant departure from the general principle that, ordinarily,
no occasion arises when an agent, in the absence of express
authority, has the authority to fix the rate of premiums. See, 43
Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 830.
VIII.

THE PREMATIC APPLICATION IS AN APPLICATION
FINANCING - NOT AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE.

FOR

Olcotts

for

do

not dispute

that

their

application

insurance coverage did not specify rates or premiums when submitted
by them10, but they point to the financing application as the sole
basis for their claim that no earned premium is owed.
10

Olcotts*

See Chilton Affidavit, Attachment 2, paragraphs 8 through
10, which state that TIE'S applications for commercial insurance
coverage, such as the Olcotts' application, do not specify rates
when submitted by the writing agents, that the setting of premiums
for each risk is the function and responsibility of the rating
department, that the rates and computations on the application were
added to the application after it was received by TIE at its
regional office and that TIE'S rates charged in the State of Utah
must conform to the rates filed by it with the Insurance
Commissioner.
- 10 -

claim that TIE is bound by the agent's estimate on the application
for financing and that the estimate should be a guaranteed maximum
premium is not sustainable for the following reasons, in addition
to those set forth in Point VII above:

(1) the Prematic agreement

is a financing agreement; (2) TIE is not a party to the PrematicOlcott financing agreement; (3) Prematic Service Corporation is not
an insurer; and

(4) the premium is clearly identified as an

"estimate."
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) defines estimate as
"a rough or approximate calculation only." Clearly, an "estimate"
is not a synonym for "maximum."

Even if the Prematic application

were deemed to contain a binding premium quote, it specifically
provides that Olcotts "[a]uthorize Prematic Service Corporation to
properly adjust the monthly premium deposit collected each month in
event of changes of coverage or rates ordered either by customer or
insurance company."

(emphasis added.)

It is significant and

undisputed that Olcott's application was incomplete, as submitted
by

them,

with

respect

to

crime

coverage

(see, page

2 of

application) and previous incidents of theft (see, page 4 of
application) . TIE should not be bound by the quote of an estimated
premium, clearly designated as such, which is based upon an
incomplete application incomplete on its face.

- 11 -

CONCLUSION
TIE respectfully suggests that the foregoing points of
fact and law, provide a sufficient basis for the Court to grant
this Petition for Rehearing and to affirm the trial court's summary
judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ / day of October, 1994.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, PC
Attorneys for Petitioner

.

/Original Signature

Harold c. verhaaren
n
David B. Hartvigsen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

o//

day of October, 1994, I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
APPELLEE

TRUCK

INSURANCE

EXCHANGE,

by causing

the

same to be

mailed, via first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Thomas J. Scribner
Wayne B. Watson
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604

r^S^f/M^M,
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Tab A

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 7 1994
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

00O00

Truck Insurance Exchange,
ORDER OF REVERSAL
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No, 930232-CA
v.
John Olcott and Betty Olcott,
dba JB's Pepper Tree Market,
Defendants and Appellants.

Before Judges Onae, Bench, and Greenwood (Rule 31 Hearing).
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is reversed, and
this matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Dated this ^fch^ilay of September, 1994.

Gregory K^-Q^erne, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

;

-j c <^--~-?

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I
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—

—
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TabB

FILED IN
4 ™ DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COU.MTY

DEC 13 llosffl'Sr
iW^

HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6161
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000O000

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff,

BRAD G. CHILTON AFFIDAVIT II

vs.
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT,
dba J.B.'S PEPPER TREE MARKET,
Case No. CV 89-760
Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.
000O000

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BANNOCK

)
: ss.
)

Brad G. Chilton being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

All matters

stated

herein

are based

upon his

personal knowledge and he is competent to testify to the matters
stated herein.
2.

He is an employee of the Plaintiff, Truck Insurance

Exchange (MTIEM), is personally acquainted with TIE'S files and
records relating to the Defendants John Olcott and Betty Olcott,
dba J.B.'s Pepper Tree Market (the "Olcotts") and the claim TIE is
asserting against the Olcotts in the above-captioned matter.

*

*i

3.
Pocatello

On or about December 5, 1984, TIE received at its

Regional

Office Olcotts' application

for insurance

coverage dated November 30, 1984, (the "Application") executed by
the Defendant John Olcott. A copy of the Application is attached
hereto as "Exhibit A."
4.

On or about November 30, 1984, the Defendant John

Olcott also executed an application and agreement with Prematic
Service Corporation ("Prematic") to finance the estimated annual
premium for the insurance coverage Olcotts applied for through
monthly budget payments.

A copy of the Prematic application and

agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit B."
5.

Prematic received two checks issued by the Defendant

John Olcott, totaling $552.59.

One check is dated November 30,

1984, in the sum of $369.59 and the other is dated January 7, 1985,
in the sum of $183.00.

Copies of each of those checks are

contained on "Exhibit C" attached hereto.
6.

No other payments have been made by Olcotts to

Prematic or TIE other than those referred to in Paragraph 5 above.
7.

Based upon the Application, TIE provided insurance

coverage for the Olcotts from November 30, 1984, until at least
February 6, 1985.
8.

Applications

to

TIE

for

commercial

insurance

coverage, such as the Application received from the Olcotts, do not
specify rates or premium computations when submitted by the writing
agents, as the setting of premiums for each risk to be insured is
the function and responsibility of TIE'S rating department.
tie.ol-2aff.bc

9

9.

When the Application was received by TIE at its

Pocatello Regional Office, it contained no premium computations or
rates.

The rates and computations shown on the Application

(Exhibit A) were added after the Application was received at TIE'S
Pocatello Regional Office.
10.

Premiums charged by TIE in the State of Utah must

conform to the rates filed by TIE with the insurance commissioner
of the State of Utah.
11.

TIE'S underwriters determined, after reviewing the

Application received from the agent, that the Olcotts' business was
not eligible for insurance coverage at TIE'S preferred rates and,
on or about January 22, 1985, TIE issued its notice that insurance
coverage was being cancelled effective February 6, 1985. A copy of
the Notice of Cancellation is attached hereto as "Exhibit D."
12.

Although a second application for insurance was

received by TIE at its Pocatello Regional Office and a policy of
insurance was issued at the higher or Mstandard" rate, the Olcotts
have stated that they did not submit a second application and did
not want insurance coverage at the higher or standard rate.
13.

The

minimum

earned

premium

due

for

Olcotts'

insurance coverage for the period beginning on November 30, 1984,
and ending on February 6, 1985, using TIE'S "preferred" or lower
rate is Three Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars and Twenty-One Cents
($367.21):

tie.ol-2aff.bc

3

Annual Premium (Preferred Rate)
Membership Fee

$4,869.00
S
60.00

Total Annual Premium:

$4,929.00

Less unearned premium based upon
early cancellation using the
customary pro rata premium calculation
referred to in the Policy.
(.814 x $4929.00 = unearned premium)
Earned Premium:

$

Less payments received
(552.59 less $3.00 service charge for
budget plan)
Earned Premium Due:
14.

5(4,012.20)
916.80

$ f549.59l

$

The pro rata decimal

(factor) of

367.21
.814 shown in

Paragraph 13 above is derived by using MThe Ronoco Six And Twelve
Month Calculator," a calibration calculator commonly used in the
insurance industry to determine pro rata and short rate earned and
unearned factors.

The calculator is prepared and produced by the

Rough Notes Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 46204.
15.

The rate used in Paragraph 13 above is based'upon

and conforms to the rates and rate modifications filed by TIE with
the insurance commissioner of the State of Utah for the period of
November 30, 1984, to February 6, 1985.
DATED this

day of December, 1991.

BRAD G. CHILTON
Subscribed ^fiS^fS^^n

to before me this

December, 1991.
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WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C.
BEVERLEY A. RAMSEY
Attorneys for Defendant
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
POREM DEPARTMENT
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff,

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY
OLCOTT dba JB'S PEPPER
TREE MARKET,

Civil No.

86-CV-89

Defendants.
COME NOW the Defendants above named and answer and counterclaim as follows:
1.

Admits paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's

complaint

2.

Defendants are without sufficient informationoand be-

lief to ascertain the truth'or falsity of the language contained
in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the complaint and therefore deny same.
3.

Defendants deny paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

WHEREFORE, having answered the complaint of Plaintiff,
Defendants pray that the same may be dismissed and that they be
awarded the request o^ their counterclaim.

nil

COUNTERCLAIM
1. On or about February 17, 1986, Plaintiff brought a cause
of action as more particularly stated in the complaint of Plaintiff herein.
2.

Said complaint has been brought by Plaintiff malicious-

ly and with no reasonable or justifiable cause.
3.

By reason of Plaintiff's actions, Defendant^ have suf-

fered injury to their credit and reputation, all to their damage
in an amount to be proven at the time of trial.
4.

By reason of the action commenced by Plaintiff, Defen-

dants will be forced to incur reasonable and necessary counsel
fees in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.
5*

By reason of Plaintiff's institution of said action,

maliciously and with intent to injury Defendants, Defendants are
therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proven
at the time of trial.
6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56, the original

complaint of Plaintiff has not been brought by the party-Plaintiff
in good faith and was without merit and therefore Defendants request reasonable attorney's fees be awarded.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plaintiff in I the above-requested amounts.
DATED this 2& day of / ^ ^

, 1986.

WAYNE/B/ WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Defendants

